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Liability of foreignness has been one of the building blocks of theories of 
multinational enterprises. This paper looks at a parallel issue - the liability of 
localness that local firms may face as a result of foreign firms’ presence in 
their country. The results show that local Chinese firms enjoy location-based 
advantages over their foreign counterparts and these, together with their 
firm-specific advantages, have significant positive effects on their 
performance. The superior firm-specific advantages of foreign firms appear 
to erase the magnitude of such effects and create a significant negative impact 
on local Chinese firms’ performance, and this effect is heightened by foreign 
firms’ multinationality advantages. The research suggests that local Chinese 
firms incur a liability of localness, and the extent of the negative impact of 
such liability on local firm performance is largely dependent on the relative 
strength of various advantages that the local and foreign firms possess.  
 









1. Introduction  
For at least fifty years, leading international business researchers (most 
notably Hymer, 1960/1976) have argued that firms operating abroad face 
considerable challenges and incur additional costs (i.e., a liability of 
foreignness, or LOF) relative to indigenous firms. These challenges and costs 
result from their lack of familiarity with local cultural norms and values, 
different economic, political, and legal systems, lack of experience in foreign 
markets and the geographic distance between the home and foreign host 
countries. As a result, an enterprise that operates outside of its national 
boundaries will incur additional costs relative to the local firms in the host 
country market (Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). A number of studies 
have recently re-examined this issue and in general confirmed that LOF-based 
competitive disadvantage still exists and affects firms’ performance adversely 
in foreign markets (e.g., Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997). However, Nachum (2003) and Kronborg and Thomsen 
(2009) challenged the conventional wisdom of the LOF, arguing that the LOF 
may not exist, and that foreignness may be either an asset or a liability 
depending on the circumstances (Nachum, 2010). While most studies of 
international competition are undertaken from the perspective of foreign firms, 
we argue that local firms are just as important to examine. How they view the 
nature of international competition may be of strategic importance to all of the 
players in the game and to their competitive positions in this ‘playground’.  
Therefore, this study goes beyond previous LOF studies and looks at the 
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players on ‘the other side of the fence’, namely locally-owned firms operating 
in their home country, suggesting that these firms may incur added costs in 
doing business at home; that is, they may suffer from a liability of localness, 
or LOL (Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008).  
From an institutional perspective, Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) first 
defined the concept of LOL as the added cost faced by local firms on account 
of sudden changes in the regulatory environment within the host country, 
allowing inward foreign investment and leading to a change in the ‘rules of 
the game’ for domestic firms. They elaborate that LOL would result from 
institutional misalignment, where newly formed institutions would favor 
foreign firms over local firms. Regulatory punctuations would undermine and 
ultimately change the host market institutions that guide local firms’ business 
practices. The net effect would be that local firms would not be familiar with 
the new ‘rules of the game’, incurring a liability of localness, inducing a 
negative impact on local firms’ performance. Our study extends Perez-Batres 
and Eden’s in two important dimensions. First, Perez-Batres and Eden suggest 
that LOL occurs when sudden institutional changes (i.e., punctuations) take 
place. We, however, argue that the LOL and the effects of it on local firm 
performance are not limited to such punctuations, but may remain present for 
as long as the foreign firms exhibit a significant competitive advantage over 
their local counterparts. This is particularly evident in the context of an 
emerging country such as China where economic liberalization began about 
three decades ago with the so-called ‘Reform and Opening Up’ initiated by 
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Deng Xiaoping, and where the new institutional arrangements (involving 
some fundamental changes to economic rules) have already permeated to the 
minds and perceptions of managers. Second, even if local (surviving) firms 
have successfully adapted to the new way of doing business locally, they are 
for the most part perceived as less legitimate (i.e., having fewer firm-specific 
advantages) than their foreign counterparts, which in turn negatively affects 
local firms’ performance. Accordingly, our central research question is: Do 
superior competitive advantages of foreign firms contribute to the creation of 
added costs (i.e., LOL) for local Chinese firms? If so, do such added costs 
have a significant negative impact on local Chinese firms’ performance in 
China? 
 
2. Institutional development and change of competitive landscape     
Institutions are social, economic and political bodies that articulate and 
maintain widely observed norms and rules (North, 1990). Since it opened up 
its economy and began the process of economic reform in 1978, China has 
experienced significant institutional change and development particularly in 
the way that political power is used (Gilley, 2008), the role of government in 
the economic and business activities, the structure of industries and firms, and 
the emergence of intermediate institutions such as professional and efficient 
business support services. Many of those changes and developments have 
gradually favored foreign investors (Child and Tse, 2001). Following a 
gradual relaxation of entry restrictions during the 1980s and 1990s, when 
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many previously restricted industries such as retailing, insurance, medical 
services, trading, accounting services, and banking were opened up to foreign 
investors, since about 2000 there has been a significant shift in governmental 
policies on foreign investment, aimed at gradually eliminating discrimination 
against foreign firms in the areas of operating rights. This progressive 
convergence in the regulatory treatment of foreign and local firms represents 
an important step toward equality for both sets of players (Luo, 2007). These 
institutional changes and developments have reduced the costs associated with 
institutional distance for foreign firms, improving the legitimacy of foreign 
firms operating in the host market (Zaheer, 2002). Relatively speaking, the 
local firms gradually lost the legitimacy that they took for granted under the 
old institutional arrangements. Therefore, such institutional developments, 
together with market liberalization, can be expected to decrease the negative 
effect of the LOF for foreign firms (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997), while a 
LOL may have been created for local firms, in turn having a negative impact 
on local firms’ performance.  
In the last decade or so, China’s competitive environment has 
fundamentally changed. Many foreign firms in China have transformed 
themselves from foreign investors to strategic insiders, shifting competition 
from niche to mass markets, from single- to multi-markets, and from 
structural similarity to multiplicity (Luo, 2007). They are now seeking to 
expand into and penetrate all market segments (Chen, 2003), aggressively 
expanding the scale and scope of their investment in new or existing projects 
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across numerous locations in China, continuing to improve their competence 
building and value-chain localization using corporate capital, fortifying their 
dominant foothold in certain market segments using the retained earnings 
accumulated on account of their China-based operations, and replicating their 
success elsewhere in China (Luo, 2007).  
Local firms in transitional economies often rely heavily on institutional-
based strategies as the main source of competitive advantage, whereas their 
foreign counterparts usually rely on resource-based strategies as their main 
source of competitive advantage (Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010). Since the set 
of advantages and disadvantages are both time- and extent-specific (Marinova, 
Child, and Marinov, 2011), when institutions are impacted by developments 
such as liberalization and privatization, the traditional and static sources of 
competitive advantage are replaced by a more dynamic perspective in which 
advantages are temporal (D’Aveni, 1994). Advantages, such as location, that 
pertain to institutional-based strategies then become less important, while 
advantages that pertain to resource-based strategies, such as firm-specific 
advantages, become vital sources of competitive advantage. As a result, local 
firms struggle to remain competitive while foreign subsidiaries are better 
prepared to sustain their competitive position and often outperform their local 
counterparts (Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010). Therefore, the competitive 
position of local and foreign firms in China is likely to be determined by the 
relative strength of their respective competitive advantages in institutional- 
and/or resource-based strategies that they developed after the sudden change 
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in the ‘rules of the game’ thirty years ago. This proposition provides the basis 
for the theoretical framework and the development of hypotheses that are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Theory and hypotheses  
Studies of the advantages held by MNCs implicitly and/or explicitly 
identify and distinguish between several aspects of competitive advantage, 
including firm-specific advantages (FSAs) arising from the possession of 
certain intangible capabilities; multi-nationality advantages (MNAs) 
associated with multinational activity per se; and home- or location-based 
advantages (LBAs) arising from the exclusive access of firms to resources and 
institutional conditions in their home countries. These advantages together 
form the competitiveness of firms in global markets, and the strength of these 
advantages can determine the relative competitive position of foreign MNCs 
and local firms (Nachum, 2003). Therefore, the existence, strength, and extent 
of LOL in China will be dependent on the relative strength of each of these 
advantages possessed by foreign and local firms, respectively. We adapted 
Nachum’s (2003) three-dimensional model (that is, FSA, MNA, and LBA) 
with some necessary extensions. In Nachum’s (2003) model, the three types 
of advantage of foreign firms were used to test LOF. We argue that either 
LOF or LOL is the aggregated outcome of various competitive advantages 
that are possessed by players from each side when competing in the same 
(China) market, consequently determining the strength of LOL. In order to 
8 
 
capture the joint impact of the three types of advantage that both local and 
foreign firms may possess, we incorporated FSAs and LBAs of both foreign 
and local firms as independent variable constructs in our framework. MNAs 
that arise directly from undertaking cross-border business activities in 
subsidiary units in various locations under a common governance structure 
(Nachum, 2003) are significant sources contributing to the creation and 
development of FSAs (Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson, 1998; Dunning, 1988; 
Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Therefore, in our conceptual framework, we 
included the multinationality advantages of both foreign and local firms as 
interactive variables that moderate the relationship between FSAs and firm 
performance. Our conceptual framework is depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
3.1 Firm-specific advantages 
Firm-specific advantages have constituted the building blocks of foreign 
direct investment research since Hymer (1960/1976) first elaborated the need 
for some FSAs as a necessary condition for foreign activities. FSAs stem from 
the proprietary assets of MNCs that arise from their production and/or 
marketing activities (Dunning, 1977). These advantages are based on the 
possession and use of certain intangible assets, such as patents, trademarks, 
management skills (Caves, 1996), and brand names, as well as skilled labor, 
knowledge of technology, and efficient production processes (Wernerfelt, 
1984), which enable the firm to reach high levels of technical or price 
Place Fig. 1 about here 
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efficiency (Caves, 1996). These intangible advantages of MNCs are 
geographically mobile and can be transferred internally within the MNC 
across national borders. These are the areas in which foreign firms have 
advantages that are superior to those of local firms, enabling them to 
compensate for the lack of access to local resources and for the additional 
costs associated with doing business abroad, and thereby to compete 
successfully in foreign countries (Hymer, 1960/1976). Foreign firms are 
generally superior to domestic firms in R&D and production and marketing, 
as they may benefit from significantly better strategic capabilities relative to 
their local domestic competitors in respect of internal dimensions, with a 
significantly higher ability to adapt to competition in the foreign markets in 
the context of external dimensions (Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996), 
and may be better able than their local counterparts to deal with rapid change 
(Lavie and Fiegenbaum, 2000). In the Chinese context, most foreign firms 
have clear competitive advantages over local firms in capabilities such as 
technology, know-how and innovation, branding, financing, IT and value-
chain creation (Williamson and Zeng, 2004). Furthermore, the theory of the 
MNC suggests that MNCs also possess advantages that arise from their 
favorable access to resources within their home countries (Hu, 1992; Nachum, 
1999). MNCs of developed countries, having operated in sophisticated home 
markets, have built skill bases that confer clear advantages over firms in most 
other countries (Erramilli, Agarwal, and Kim, 1997). 
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In contrast, local Chinese firms lag far behind foreign firms in the 
development of FSAs—especially with respect to technology (Nolan, 2004), 
experience in innovative activities and top management talent (Rugman and 
Li, 2007). Chinese firms also tend to be protected, resource-based, labor-
intensive, low-technology, and inefficient (Nolan, 2004). Their competitive 
advantage is based on home-country location-specific advantages in cheap, 
unskilled and skilled labor. Thus, Chinese firms have a long way to go to 
become competitive in international markets because of intense global 
competition and because they lack the necessary FSAs (Rugman and Li, 
2007). In contrast, the superior FSAs of foreign firms operating in China help 
them to mitigate LOF that they may incur and enhance their competitiveness 
in the market in competing with Chinese firms. Correspondingly, this creates 
enormous pressure on local firms and increases their cost of doing business. 
As institutions develop, FSAs become more and more important. Accordingly, 
the relative strength of foreign firms over local firms, and the relative 
weakness of local firms compared with foreign firms, becomes more apparent. 
To compensate for and/or mitigate such competitive disadvantages requires 
local firms to commit significant additional firm resources and effort, in turn 
increasing their costs of doing business due to the presence of foreign firms. 




Hypothesis 1. Foreign firms outperform local Chinese firms in terms of FSAs, 
and these foreign firms’ competitive advantages create an LOL for local 
Chinese firms, with a negative effect on local Chinese firms’ performance. 
 
3.2 Location (China)-based advantages 
Hymer (1960/1976) argued that indigenous firms have the general 
advantage of better information about their country regarding its economy, 
language, laws, and policies. Local firms enjoy favorable access to the 
resources of their home country relative to foreign firms, due to favorable 
treatment by the government, consumers and suppliers. His theoretical 
propositions have since been supported by many important studies (e.g., 
Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). 
Arguably, this paradigm should be even more strongly supported when 
multinational companies from the developed world explore business 
opportunities in emerging markets in which there are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, institutional voids such as the absence of specialized intermediaries 
and contract-enforcement mechanisms. However, managers from foreign 
firms are used to operating in economies with well-developed institutional 
infrastructures and are generally therefore ill-equipped to deal with such voids. 
In contrast, the managers of local companies know how to work around 
institutional voids because they have had years of experience doing so 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2006), and they are often able to turn such institutional 
voids to their competitive advantage. Hence, we can expect indigenous firms 
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to possess more of the advantages that arise from the utilization of the 
resources of their home countries. 
Firms are also the product of the locations in which they operate, and 
effective firms will seek to build on competencies forged in their home 
country.  Local firms are established in the context of appreciable location-
specific advantages and proceed in a way that showcases those advantages 
(Erramilli et al., 1997). Thus, they are usually well versed in domestic 
customs and priorities and have the ability to utilize this local knowledge to 
their advantage (Vachani, 1990). This advantage is further emphasized in 
high-context cultures such as China, where ‘guanxi’ relationships pervade all 
levels of enterprise and government, and outsiders can find it difficult to gain 
traction (Ping, 2003). China is a complex society and this complexity could be 
a critical challenge for most outsiders operating in China, but it could also be 
a competitive advantage for local firms that are deeply rooted in the 
environment (Jiang, 2005). Such location-related assets provide local firms 
with some strong competitive advantages that foreign firms do not have 
(Nachum, 2003). We can thus expect local Chinese firms to outperform 
foreign firms in China in terms of location-based advantages. We therefore 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Local Chinese firms outperform foreign firms in terms of 
LBAs, and these local Chinese firms’ competitive advantages eliminate the 
negative effect of the LOL for local Chinese firms, with a positive effect on 




3.3 Multi-nationality advantages 
An MNC’s firm-specific advantages can originate in both the parent 
company and its subsidiaries (Dunning, 1988), and the subsidiaries can play 
an even more important role in the creation and maintenance of such 
advantages (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). The existing literature has revealed 
a shift in the locus of firm-specific advantage creation from parent company 
to subsidiaries (e.g. Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1996). Subsidiaries can play 
such a role by acting as contributors to or leaders of innovation projects 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986). They could provide major outflows of valued 
resources to the rest of the corporation (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1994), and 
they can gain mandates for developing and producing certain product lines on 
a global basis (Roth and Morrison, 1992). Therefore, many subsidiaries could 
act as specialized contributors or strategic leaders, contributing substantially 
to the creation and maintenance of FSAs. However, it should be noted that 
subsidiaries vary in the role they play with respect to contributing to FSAs. 
Some subsidiaries could also act as implementer and branch plant, having 
simple market exploitation roles (Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson, 1998).  
 Multi-nationality advantages arise directly from undertaking cross-border 
business activities under a common governance structure (Nachum, 2003). 
The advantages of multi-nationality are thus associated with the coordination 
of multiple geographically-dispersed, value-added activities, including the 
ability to spread common and central overhead over many different nations 
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(which is especially critical in R&D-intensive industries that require 
amortization of R&D from more than a few markets) (Kobrin, 1991; Tallman 
and Li, 1996); the facilitation of greater learning from international 
experience (Kobrin, 1991); access to cheaper and valuable resources in 
foreign countries (which could include cheaper labor, better technology, or 
any country-specific resource) (Porter, 1990); the ability to monitor global 
rivals, markets, and other profit opportunities; and better cross-subsidization, 
price discrimination, and arbitrage potential as a result of the greater 
geographic scope (Contractor, Kundu, and Hsu, 2003). Hence, the greater the 
degree of multi-nationality of a given MNC, the better will be its management 
regime (Teece, 1977). This leads to improved firm performance, especially 
when the firm’s degree of multi-nationality is based on FDI (Morck and 
Yeung, 1992).  
Foreign firms conducting FDI in China are by definition participants in 
international networks. The set of competitive advantages of an MNC thus 
includes competitive advantages that are partly derived from the resources of 
the home country as well as those resulting from the strategic activities of the 
firm in the global marketplace (Dunning, 1977). MNCs benefit from national 
differences in market structure, product life cycles, and environmental 
resources through utilizing their monopolistic advantages (Hymer, 
1960/1976). Their cross-border business activities and associated benefits 
help them develop and enhance their FSAs. These advantages can eliminate 
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the LOF they may face and enhance their competitiveness in competing with 
Chinese firms in the market.   
 
Hypothesis 3a. The multinationality advantages of foreign firms moderate 
the relationship between their firm-specific advantages and local firm 
performance, such that the negative relationship between multinationality 
advantages of foreign firms and performance of local firms is stronger when 
the level of advancement of multinationality advantages of foreign firms is 
high.   
 
Local Chinese firms arguably do not possess many strong competitive 
advantages compared with their global rivals (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Rui and 
Yip, 2008). This is mainly due to the fact that these firms have firm-specific 
disadvantages in many areas such as lack of production and technological 
knowhow, lack of brand recognition, lack of production resources, lack of 
management knowhow, lack of marketing skills, lack of quality control 
systems, and limited financial resources. Innovations, knowhow, technology, 
production processes, marketing, and managerial expertise are readily 
available in developed country contexts where they could be accessed by 
Chinese firms investing outwards (Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011). 
Thus, Chinese firms may move into developed markets with the strategic 
intent to acquire such assets with the potential to enhance their FSAs (Cui and 
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Jiang, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008), and to compensate for competitive 
disadvantages in the host country context (Child & Rodrigues, 2005).   
Thus, outward-investing firms from emerging countries that have firm-
specific disadvantages often attempt to acquire strategic resources such as 
technology, design, and brands from companies in developed economies 
(Schüler-Zhou & Schüler, 2009). This is needed as such firms often do not 
have the capabilities or resources to turn firm-specific disadvantages into 
FSAs on their own or in partnership with foreign firms in their home country. 
Firm-specific disadvantages can be compensated for in the international arena 
by means of transfer (e.g. joint ventures, licensing), acquisition (of 
technologies, designs, brands, etc.), and internal independent learning (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005; Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011; Rugman and Li, 
2007), especially when R&D centers are set up in developed host countries 
(Forest, 2001), as most Chinese outward-investing firms have been doing 
(Marinova, Child, and Marinov, 2011; Wang, 2002). Thus outward FDI is 
pulled towards unavailable, complementary and compatible resources, 
especially in the form of knowledge that can be used as a stepping stone to 
accelerate independent innovation. Compensating for firm-specific 
disadvantages has become a key priority for Chinese firms and the Chinese 
government. In line with Confucian notions of self-development through 
continuous learning from peers, the rapid internationalization of Chinese 
companies in recent years is an attempt to acquire needed capabilities (Cui 
and Jiang, 2009; Wesson, 2004) with the intention of enhancing their FSAs. 
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This is evident in a number of leading Chinese companies such as Haier, 
Galanz, Gree, Lenovo, Huawei, and Nanjing Automotive, which initially 
experienced various firm-specific disadvantages but successfully turned them 
into FSAs a few years after conducting outward investment (Marinova, Child, 
and Marinov, 2011). We therefore propose the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 3b. The multinationality advantages of local firms moderate the 
relationship between their firm-specific advantages and firm performance, 
such that the positive relationship between multinationality advantages of 
local firms and local firm performance is stronger when the level of 
advancement of multinationality advantages of local firms is high.  
 
3.4 Relative importance of various advantages 
Although local firms are often well placed to assess and respond to 
economic trends within their own country, such firms occupy a potentially 
risky position depending on the economic characteristics of their home 
country. MNCs, on the other hand, are able to reduce risk by effectively 
engaging in international portfolio investment. It is the firm’s ability to 
balance this portfolio that will determine risks and returns and that will 
ultimately prove to be either a competitive advantage or a weakness. MNCs 
from developed countries have a significant competitive advantage in this 
regard, outperforming their developing country counterparts, and the most 
profitable enterprises may prove to be those developed-country MNCs that 
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have operations in developing countries (Collins, 1990). A multinational firm 
can reduce the negative impact of its liability of foreignness compared to 
domestic competitors by learning about the host-country environment through 
the accumulation of investment experience there (Barkema, Bell, and 
Pennings, 1996) and by gaining capabilities that are relevant to the host 
country (Chang, 1995). This process of learning about the host-country 
environment may further strengthen some of the FSAs of MNCs because the 
relevance and importance of FSAs are host-location specific, too (Buckley, 
1990; Dunning, 1988). The host country becomes especially important in 
studies dealing with FDI, since the different configuration of a host-country’s 
institutional development can either strengthen them or render them redundant 
(Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010). 
China now is very far away from a centrally-planned economic system 
(Elliot, Jiang, Redding and Stening, 2010), and the level of the development 
of its institutions has moved to a much more advanced level compared to that 
which existed before the country opened its door for foreign investment over 
thirty years ago (Child and Tse, 2001). In line with the logic of Hermelo and 
Vassolo (2010), as institutions develop, the resource-based advantages of 
firms, such as FSAs and MNAs, have been becoming more important for 
competitive success than institutional-based advantages that result from 
access to LBAs. Therefore, in the Chinese context, FSAs and MNAs may 
provide more explanatory power for the relative performance of foreign firms 
vis-à-vis local firms than location-based advantages. On the one hand, this 
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means that the FSAs and MNAs that foreign firms possess can help them 
offset the negative impacts of competitive disadvantages (i.e. LOF). On the 
other hand, the advantages enjoyed by local Chinese firms as a result of their 
favorable access to LBAs cannot compensate for the negative effects of their 
competitive disadvantage in terms of firm-specific and multi-nationality 
advantages. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of local Chinese firms’ location-based 
advantages over foreign firms on the performance of local firms is not 
sufficient to compensate for the negative effect of local firms’ lack of 
competitiveness in terms of firm-specific and multi-nationality disadvantages.  
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Sample and data collection 
Large Chinese firms, especially those located in China’s east coastal areas 
which have attracted over eighty percent of foreign investments, are on the 
front line in competing with foreign entrants and are usually the main Chinese 
competitors targeted by foreign firms. For that reason, we determined that 
they should constitute the sample frame for our study. We identified the 
largest 1,000 purely local firms (i.e. Chinese firms with no foreign ownership) 
from the ORBIS Database published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing in 2007. The senior executives (e.g., CEOs, general managers, and 
marketing directors/managers) of those firms are best placed to provide 
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information about the nature of competition and tensions between their firm 
and foreign firms in mainland China. They, then, were the people to whom 
our request for information was directed.  
A structured questionnaire was used to obtain the perceptions of senior 
executives of local Chinese firms regarding the strength of the three types of 
advantages and the performance of both local firms and their main foreign 
competitors. The questionnaire was translated into Chinese by two bilinguals 
and was pre-tested before the survey commenced. We required that the 
respondents be senior executives who had sufficient knowledge about the 
competitive positions of their own company and their main foreign 
competitors in China. The respondents were assured of the anonymity and 
confidentiality of their responses, that there are no right or wrong answers, 
and that they should answer as honestly as possible. They were asked to first 
evaluate the level of advancement in terms of each of the independent 
variable indicators (the various advantages) and the level of firm performance 
as measured by the dependent variable metrics of their own (local Chinese) 
firms. They were then also asked to evaluate the same set of independent 
variable indicators for their main respective foreign competitors that had been 
competing in the same market segment or product market. Following a 
common practice in Delphi studies (Sniezek, 1989), the respondents were also 
requested to estimate their self-perceived level of “expertise” on five-point 
scales (‘1’ being lowest and ‘5’ being highest) in relation to their subjective 
evaluation of each of the independent and dependent variable indicators. 
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These “expertise” ratings were included as weights to reflect the fact that, in 
assessing various advantages of both foreign and local firms, it was likely that 
some respondents would not feel equally competent to provide estimates of 
the level of advantages of their foreign competitors as they would for those of 
their own firm. The weighted score for each dependent and independent 
variable indicator was generated by means of multiplying the original raw 
score of each indicator by the self-assessed score of expertise in evaluating 
the variable indicator, which was then divided by the sum of scores of all the 
observations. The subsequent steps in the statistical analyses used the 
weighted scores, with the exception of the scale reliability test and Harman’s 
one-factor test to detect the presence of common method effect.  
A total of 935 questionnaires were delivered, mainly via facsimile (but 
complemented by postal mail), of which 136 were completed and returned 
after telephone follow-ups, over a period of two months in 2007. In addition, 
65 questionnaires were delivered in person to firms in the sample frame via 
networking connections, 63 of which were completed and returned to us. In 
total, 199 firms returned questionnaires. A screening of the returned 
questionnaires found that 185 were usable, constituting a response rate of 
18.5%. The main foreign rivals identified by the respondents are from 17 
economies: 70.1% from developed countries, 25.6% firms from newly 





We used the performance of local Chinese firms as the dependent variable. 
Following Nachum’s (2003) approach, we then created a single compound 
measure for the dependent and each of the independent variable constructs by 
summing the weighted scores of the individual variable indicators for each 
construct. This is also consistent with the hypotheses that we developed at the 
level of overall advantages, referring specifically to the three types of 
advantage rather than to their individual indicator items.  
 
4.2.1 Dependent variable indicators 
The performance of the local Chinese firms was measured using five 
subjective assessment questions on five-point scales (‘1’ being poor and ‘5’ 
being outstanding). The five firm-performance indicators ( = 0.93) covered 
profitability, market share, sales growth, competitive position (Aulakh, 
Kotabe, and Teegen, 2000; Fey and Bjorkman, 2001), and the quality of 
products/services (Fey and Bjorkman, 2001). These measures have been 
widely used for the performance of both emerging and foreign firms in prior 
studies. The measurement of firm performance may be particularly 
problematic in emerging economies. Financial reporting problems emanate 
from a variety of causes, including lack of standards, differing regimes and 
systems, lack of enforcement of reporting, unreported activity involving 
bartering, and substantial inflation and devaluation of local currencies. These 
sorts of problems apply to all facets of the accounting process and to both 
listed and non-listed companies in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 
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2000). China is no exception. As Devonshire-Ellis and Zhang (2011) note, 
accounts have consistently been shown to be incorrectly prepared for reasons 
ranging from incompetence (low levels of accounting education) to fraud. 
Therefore, just as subjective measures of firm performance relative to 
competitors are frequently more reliable and valid in studying emerging 
businesses (Chandler and Hanks, 1994), so are they likely to be more suitable 
in measuring firm performance in emerging countries. Such a subjective 
managerial assessment approach has been widely used in research studies 
focused on China (e.g., Luo, 1997).  
 
4.2.2 Independent variable indicators 
The independent variable indicators were adopted from earlier research 
studies. In comparison with most prior studies on the LOF, we incorporate a 
relatively larger set of variables with the aim of capturing as comprehensively 
as possible the various advantages that a local or foreign firm may possess; 
this was necessary to address the shortcomings of using a limited number of 
indicative items, as suggested by prior studies (e.g., Nachum, 2003). The 
indicators and sources of the indicators, and Cronbach's Alpha for each 
variable, are summarized in Table 1. All of the indicators for each 
independent variable were measured on a five-point scale (‘1’ being very low 
and ‘5’ being very high).   
         Place Table 1 about here
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4.2.3 Control variables  
A set of control variables that has commonly been used in prior studies 
(e.g., Luo and Park, 2001; Nachum, 2003) was included in our model tests. 
Given the substantial differences in market conditions between industrial and 
nonindustrial sectors, we controlled for industry effects using a dummy 
variable. The service sector was coded as ‘0’ and the manufacturing sector 
was coded as ‘1’. The age and ownership of local Chinese firms were 
included in our LOL model. The age of firms was expressed in terms of the 
number of years since their establishment. A state-owned local firm was 
coded as ‘1’; otherwise, the firm was coded as ‘0’.  
 
4.2.4 Model specification 
In order to test the hypotheses, a model was constructed to examine the 
effects of the various types of advantage of both foreign and Chinese firms on 
local Chinese firms’ performance.  
 
Plc= + LFSAs + _LBAs + FFSAs + F_LBAs + 
       L_MNAs F_MNAs + L_FSAs × L_MNAs + F_FSAs×F_MNAs 
+ IS + Age + SO + e 
Where, Plc = performance of local Chinese firm; L_FSAs = firm-specific 
advantages of Chinese firm; L_LBAs = location (China)-based advantages of 
Chinese firm; F_FSAs = firm-specific advantages of foreign firm; F_LBAs = 
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location (China)-based advantages of foreign firm; L_MNAs = multi-
nationality advantages of Chinese firm (moderator); F_MNAs = multi-
nationality advantages of foreign firm (moderator); F_FSAs×F_MNAs and 
L_FSAs×L_MNAs and interactive terms; IS = industrial sector; SO = state 
ownership of Chinese firm; and Age = age of Chinese firm. 
 
5. Analysis and results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the operational measures, descriptive statistics, and 
correlations between independent and moderating variables, as well as the 
control variables. None of the correlation coefficients is greater than 0.6. A 
correlation coefficient above 0.6 is considered somewhat high (Churchill, 
1991). We further checked the variance inflation factor (VIF) when 
performing the regression analysis procedures. The VIF for all of the 
variables are well below the suggested cut-off point of ten (Hair et al., 1998). 




5.2 Model fit 
We performed hierarchical moderated multiple regression to test the impact 
of various advantages of local Chinese and foreign firms on local Chinese 
 Place Table 2 about here
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firms’ performance, and the results are presented in Table 3. The results show 
that the F statistics generated in all of the models are all significant at the .001 
level, indicating good fit of the models.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis test results 
The signs of the beta coefficients1 for all of main effect (independent) 
variables are in the hypothesized direction. Amongst the four independent 
variables, three of which, namely L_FSA, L_LBA, and F_FSA were found 
statistically significant, while the estimate for F_LBA was insignificant. 
F_FSAs (resource-based advantages) has the largest beta coefficient with the 
highest level of significance amongst all the independent variables. The 
positive signs of coefficients for L_FSA and L_LBA, with p-values less 
than .05 and .001 respectively, mean that local firms’ firm-specific and 
location-based advantages contributed positively to their firm performance, 
while the negative sign of the coefficients for F_FSA, with p-values less 
than .01, suggests a negative effect on local firm performance. By comparing 
the beta coefficients of the independent variables, we found that the relative 
power in explaining the contribution of various advantages to the performance 
of local firms between each pair of the corresponding advantages (L_FSAs vs. 
F_FSAs, and L_LBAs vs. F_LBAs) was in line with Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, respectively. The beta coefficient of F_FSA (3=-0.281, p<.001) 
was significantly higher than that of L_FSA (1=0.138, p<.05), suggesting 
Place Table 3 about here 
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that foreign firms outperform local firms in FSAs (resource-based advantages). 
In contrast, the beta coefficient of L_LBA (2=0.203, p<.01) was significantly 
greater than that of F_LBA (4=-0.082, p>.1), suggesting that local firms 
outperform foreign firms in LBAs (institutional-based advantages). When 
comparing Model 2, that included only the advantages of local firms, with the 
full model (Model 10), that included all types of advantages of both foreign 
and local firms, there was a significant improvement (24.8% improvement in 
Adj-R2) in the regression.  
The magnitudes of beta coefficients for all types of advantages of local 
firms were significantly decreased after the variables of various advantages 
foreign firms were included in the regression analyses in subsequent steps, 
suggesting that foreign firm advantages reduce the magnitude of the positive 
effect of local firm advantages on the performance of local firms, exerting 
negative impacts on local firms’ performance metrics. To summarize, these 
results suggest that foreign firms outperform local firms in terms of firm-
specific advantages (resource-based advantages), and the competitive 
advantages of foreign firms over local firms create added costs for the local 
firms (i.e. a LOL) and exert a significant and direct negative impact on local 
firms’ performance. In contrast, local firms outperform foreign firms in terms 
of location-based (institutional-based) advantages, and the competitive 
advantages of local firms over foreign firms in location-based advantages 
eliminate the negative effect of LOL and have a positive effect on local firm 
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performance. Therefore, both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are supported, 
respectively.  
Hypothesis 3a argues that the negative relationship between the 
multinationality advantages of foreign firms and local firm performance is 
stronger when the level of advancement of multinationality advantages of 
foreign firms is high. As shown in Model 8, the interaction term 
(F_LBAs×F_MNAs) was negative and statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Moreover, the results in the full model (Model 10) corroborate this result very 
well. This model includes another two-way interaction term 
(L_LBAs×L_MNAs). Even with the other interaction term, the effect of 
F_FSAs by F_MNAs remains negative and statistically significant. We also 
graphed the interactions of F_FSAs and F_MNAs on the performance of local 
firms (see Fig. 2). As expected, the plot reveals that the negative relationship 
between multinationality advantages of foreign firms and local firm 
performance is stronger when the level of advancement of multinationality 
advantages of foreign firms is high. Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported. 
 
 
In contrast, Hypothesis 3b argues that the positive relationship between 
multinationality advantages and performance of local firms is stronger when 
the level of advancement of multinationality advantages of local firms is high. 
As shown in Model 6, although the interaction term (L_LBAs×L_MNAs) was 
Place Fig. 2 about here 
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positive, it was not statistically significant (p=0.760). Moreover, the results in 
the full model (Model 10) corroborate this result very well. The plot in Fig. 3 
also reveals that the positive relationship between firm-specific advantages 
and performance of local firms is not significantly stronger when the 
multinationality advantages of local firms is high. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is not 
supported.  
 
The results also show that there are four variables including three 
independent variables and one moderator which exhibit a significant direct 
impact on local firm performance. Of the three independent variables that are 
significant in the model, both L_FSA and L_LBA exhibit significant and 
positive impacts on the performance of local firms, thereby eliminating the 
negative impact of the LOL for local firms, whereas, F_FSAs and F_MNAs (a 
moderator that also has a significant direct impact on the dependent variable) 
exhibit a significant and negative impact on the performance of local firms. 
However, the combined explanatory power of the L_FSAs and L_LBAs 
(1+2=0.341) is significantly weaker than that of F_FSAs and F_MNAs 
(3+6 = 0.429), suggesting that the overall positive effect of local firm’s firm-
specific and location-based advantages on their firm performance are not 
sufficient to eliminate the negative effect of the foreign firms’ superior firm-
specific and multi-nationality advantages on local firm performance. 
Place Fig. 3 about here 
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Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported. Model 10 also shows that the older 
Chinese firms may incur more LOL (=0.178, p<.01).  
 
5.4 Results validation 
In the absence of an additional sample, we performed validity tests before 
and after model-testing procedures. Prior to model testing, we tested the non-
response bias in our analysis sample of 185 firms. Independent sample t-tests 
were performed to compare the early and later response groups on the values 
of all the variables, and no significant difference is found between early and 
late response groups. This suggests that non-response bias did not exist in our 
sample.                                 
We also adopted the following approach suggested by Hair et al. (1998) to 
validate the results. We split the sample into two sub-samples. Sub-sample 1 
included the first 50% of the received usable questionnaires (n=93), and Sub-
sample 2 included the second 50% of the received usable questionnaires 
(n=92). We then performed stepwise regression analysis for the main effect 
variables plus one of the moderators – F_MNAs – which also had a 
significant main effect on the dependent variable using the overall sample 
(n=185) and the two sub-samples. The results are shown in Table 4. 
Comparison of the overall model fit indicates a high level of similarity of the 
results with respect to R2, adjusted R2, and standard error of the estimates. In 
comparing the individual coefficients, three out of four variables appear to be 
consistent across all three samples. However, one difference does appear. In 
31 
 
sub-sample 1 and sub-sample 2, one variable – Firm-specific advantages of 
local firms – did not enter in the stepwise results as it did in the overall 
sample. The omission of this variable in the two sub-samples may confirm 
that it was the weakest predictor amongst four variables, as indicated by the 
beta and t values in the overall model. In addition, the smaller sample size of 
the sub-samples may have also contributed to the results. Overall, the results 
indicate that the samples represent the population. 
Studies that investigate perceptions using surveys run the risk of common 
method variance, that is, variance that is attributable to the measurement 
methods or construct indicators rather than to the constructs of interest. 
Following Podsakoff and Organ’s (1986) study, we used Harman’s one-factor 
test to measure the presence of the common method effect, and found no 
evidence of common method variance in the data. 
                                               
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Prior LOF-based studies focused on the additional cost confronted by 
foreign firms, adjusting to the changes of geographical location – physical 
distance, or as Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) noted, adjusting to “here” being 
different from “there”. Perez-Batres and Eden’s (2008) LOL study concerns 
the added cost to local firms, adjusting to changes in institutional settings over 
time – time horizon, or adjusting to “now” being different from “then”. In our 
study, we look at what happened to LOL after Perez-Batres and Eden’s (2008) 
Place Table 4 about here
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“now” and argue that, in the case of China, the LOL is still evident even after 
about three decades of changes in the ‘rules of the game’, the evolution and 
development of institutions and the adjustment of local firms’ strategies to 
address such changes. We further argue that, complementing Perez-Batres and 
Eden’s study, the persistence of such LOL is due to the inability of local firms 
to adapt to those institutional developments, making LBAs less legitimate, 
and to the ineffectiveness of those firms in addressing their resource-based 
competitive disadvantages relative to their foreign counterparts. While all 
other hypotheses are supported, there was not sufficient evidence to support 
Hypothesis 3b. This unexpected finding may suggest that rather than acting as 
contributors to headquarters or leaders of innovation projects that contribute 
to the development or enhancement of FSAs (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986), the 
subsidiaries of most Chinese MNEs are likely playing roles as implementers 
and branch plants that do not contribute significantly to FSAs, as described by 
Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson (1998). International expansion (e.g. 
acquisitions) can be an effective way to acquire knowledge in the form of 
technological capabilities, management, and strategic skills. However, this 
may not apply to Chinese firms which are still at an early stage of 
internationalization because of their broad lack of experience with innovation, 
making it difficult for them to recognize and absorb all of the potential value 
of an acquired company. The lack of such experience may delay the 
knowledge transfer and integration process (Rugman and Li, 2007).  
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Overall, this study goes beyond the previous studies on LOF-related MNCs 
theories from foreign firms’ perspectives that have been a building block of 
MNCs theory development in the last fifty years, and taken from local firms’ 
perspectives, joins academic debates on one of the new frontier, yet under-
researched issues, LOL, that confront international business researchers and 
practitioners. This line of research may challenge many existing MNCs 
theories that have been developed based on ‘one side of perspective. 
Therefore, the findings of this study carry important implications for 
academics, managers of foreign and local firms, and policy makers in China.  
 
6.1 Implications for theory 
This research has contributed to theory by looking at the other side of the 
LOF-fence, that is, the impact on local indigenous firms of foreign firms’ 
entry and foreign firm’s competitive advantages over those local firms – in 
other words, the liability of localness. More specifically, this study 
contextualizes the organization-level variables that may directly explain the 
cause and existence of LOL and the impact of LOL on firm performance. This 
complements the pioneering study of LOL by Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) 
that explained the institutional-level (i.e. indirect) conditions that may cause 
LOL.  
 
6.2 Managerial relevance 
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The findings of this study carry important practical implications for both 
local and foreign firms in China. In relation to local firms, as foreign firms 
catch up with LBAs such as local market knowledge (Li-Hua, 2007), and 
Chinese institutions keep developing, the superior LBAs of local firms may 
not be sustained for long. Local firms should thus avoid reliance on such type 
of advantages, especially those created by the institutional support provided 
by the home-country government, and should seek to become more effective 
and innovative in capability upgrading which is essential to the evolutionary 
development of sustainable advantages and creating new bundles of resources 
(Luo, 2000). 
Chinese firms have been proactively seeking cooperation with foreign 
firms at home and abroad with the aim of addressing their firm-specific 
disadvantages (Cui and Jiang, 2009 and 2012; Kang and Jiang, 2012), while 
MNCs, especially from developed countries, often view cooperation with 
local partners (e.g. joint venture) as inferior to sole-operator enterprises which 
allow foreign firms to maximize the returns on their FSAs (Jiang, 2006). The 
findings of this study clearly reveal that both local and foreign firms have 
their competitive advantages as well as competitive disadvantages, and their 
strengths and weaknesses are highly complementary to each other. Adopting 
the logic underpinning the implications for North American scholars in the 
study by Perez-Batres, Pisani, and Doh (2010), foreign firms should take a 
proactive role in forming cooperation with local firms in order to effectively 
address their institutional-based disadvantages in China and to be more 
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effectively eliminating the LOF they may confront there. China is becoming 
an increasingly competitive market, and its fast growing economy continues 
to present many win-win opportunities through cooperation with the local 
businesses. Thus, cooperation should form an important part of the long-term 
sustainable competitive strategy of firms (Dagnino, 2009), especially for 
foreign firms operating in countries such as China where the ever-changing 
business environment keeps posing never-ending challenges for them.  
The structure of markets in developing countries often helps local firms 
counter their foreign rivals (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). The Chinese product 
market is comprised of five tiers; foreign rivals often find it difficult and 
costly to serve anything but the tier 1 and tier 2 markets due to institutional 
voids (Chen, 2003). The managers of local firms, on the other hand, know 
how to work around and exploit such institutional voids because they have 
had years of experience doing so. Their familiarity with the local context 
allows them to identify and meet customers’ needs more effectively and 
efficiently (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). In addition, some large Chinese firms 
such as Lenovo and Huawei are competing successfully in countries on the 
basis of FSAs which they have developed in recent years (Marinova, Child, 
and Marinov, 2011). These, together with their LBAs, mean that they are 
capable of competing with and outperforming foreign giants in the Chinese 
market. Therefore, a higher level of cooperation and collaboration with such 
present (or future) leading Chinese firms will certainly strengthen the foreign 
firms’ competitive position in China and internationally. Foreign firms in 
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China have been aiming to turn themselves from foreign investors to strategic 
insiders in China (Luo, 2007).  Now may be the time for them to consider 
transforming themselves further to become strategic allies of selected Chinese 
firms. More specifically, foreign firms could achieve this by forming or 
strengthening vertical and/or inter-organizational linkages with relatively 
competitive Chinese firms in order to combine the strength of, or take 
advantage of the complementary resources and capabilities of, both local 
Chinese and foreign firms. Besides helping them compete successfully with 
other competitors in the China market, it should help the foreign firms achieve 
greater corporate-level synergy among subsidiaries globally, providing 
competitive advantages in the global marketplace, especially in the markets of 
other transitional economies.   
 
6.3 Implications for policy makers 
Policy makers in China might also draw some implications from this study. 
In particular, they should reflect on the need to further improve the investment 
environment to create fair competition, providing incentives and necessary 
support for local firms to become more innovative, so as to develop and 
strengthen their resource-based competitive advantages such as FSAs and 
MNAs. While much has already been done to reform the system in relation to 
enterprises that are state-owned, efforts to make all Chinese enterprises 





6.4 Limitations and future research directions 
An important limitation that future research should seek to address is that 
this study has provided a snapshot that does not capture all of the complexities 
of the real situation. Thus, besides incorporating the perspectives of foreign 
firms, future research should seek to build a longitudinal data set to examine 
how LOL evolves and how the competitive position of both foreign and 
Chinese firms changes over time in this huge and rapidly-changing market.  
Both Perez-Batres and Eden’s study (2008) and this study have firmly 
argued that LOL does exist. However, whether localness always presents a 
liability would be an interesting theoretical and practical proposition for 
future studies to examine. The inclusion of a number of parameters such as 
the FDI motivation of foreign firms, entry mode of foreign firms, definition of 
targeted product market, and level of institutional development in a given host 
country may better explain whether localness is a liability or a benefit for 
local firms. Empirically, both Perez-Batres and Eden’s study (2008) and this 
study were undertaken in the context of emerging developing economies. In 
recent years, many MNCs from emerging developing economies such as 
China and India have been actively investing in developed countries. Do local 
firms in developed countries incur a liability of localness as a result of the 
presence of developing country MNCs in their country? An investigation into 
this issue could make useful theoretical and empirical contributions. Finally, 
the nature of the dynamics of LOL and LOF and the interactions between 
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them may be another area of interest and significance to academics, 
practitioners, and policy makers.   
 
Notes 
1. We used standardized regression coefficients () (Hair et al., 1998) for 
the purpose of comparing the relative strength of the various types of 
advantage for a local Chinese or a foreign firm in relation to their impacts on 
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Fig. 1. Relative competitive strength of various advantages of local and foreign firms determining local firm performance. 
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Independent and moderating variable constructs, sources and scale reliability. 
 




Local Chinese firm     Foreign  firm
   
   
Firm-specific advantages  = 0.80  = 0.82 
Brand name Caves, 1996.  
Technology advancement Helpman, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984. 
R&D intensity Morck and Yeung, 1992; Rugman, 1981. 
Knowledge acquisition and value creation Rugman and Sukpanich, 2006 
Financial strength Nachum, 2003. 
Firm size Nachum, 2003. 
Marketing skills Morck and Yeung, 1992 
Management skills Nachum, 2003. 
Innovation ability and success Caves, 1996. 
   
Location (China)- based advantages   = 0.80  = 0.86 
Access to local information Nachum, 2003.  
Connection to local markets Fiegenbaum, Lavie, and Shoham, 2004. 
Ability to respond local market/customer needs Sally, 2007. 
Product and service preference of local customers Nachum, 2003. 
Reliance on local resources  Nachum, 2003. 
Local government support Derkinderen, 1982. 
   
Multinationality advantages   = 0.71  = 0.77 
Intensity of international business activity Nachum, 2003.  
Knowledge of global market Lemi, 2006. 
Access to global financial resources Collins, 1990. 
Access to global HR resources Ger, 1999.  
Global synergy Meyer, 2004. 
   









Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1. Firm-specific advantage  
    of local firms  
Compound variable 23.721 23.584 2.351 1.000  
2. Location (China)-based  
    advantage of local firms 
Compound variable 23.559 25.114 2.173    .567***     1.000    
3. Firm-specific advantage   
    of foreign firms 
Compound variable 38.945 38.649 2.805   -.444***    -.484***    1.000      
4. Location (China)-based  
    advantage of foreign firms 
Compound variable 20.921 20.260 3.298   -.250**     -.341***    .470***   1.000      
5. Multi-nationality  
    advantage of local firms  
Compound variable   8.337 8.276 1.288    .416***   .489***  -,470       -.266***      1.000  
6. Multi-nationality  
    Advantage of foreign firms 
Compound variable 21.845 21.676 1.643   -.439***    -.398***    .591***  .520***  -.354  1.000   
7. Industrial sector  Dummy  
(Manufacturing, service) 
0.640 0.482     .216**     .438***    -.420***  -.377***   .329***   -.402*** 1.000  
8. State ownership  Dummy  
(State, no-state ownership)
0.730 0.445     .040    -.096    -.018  -.009  -.018   -.002   .048 1.000   
9. Age   No. of years since 
establishment  
25.649 3.161     -.013     .068    -.185*   -.155*  .259***   -.102  -.023  .013  1.000 
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001; (2-tailed). 















 Advantages of local firms  Advantages of local and foreign firms 
Model 0    Model 1    Model 2   Model 3    Model 4   Model 5    Model 6  Model 7  Model 8   Model 9 Model 10 VIF 
Control variables            
Industrial sector      0.444*** 0.228***    0.229***   0.156*   0.127*  0.119†    0.120†   0.106†   0.110†  0.099    0.104† 1.487 
State ownership      -0.041 0.008    0.001  -0.012 -0.012 -0.012   -0.010  -0.006  -0.008 -0.006   -0.008 1.043 
Age     -0.069  -0.119  -0.118*     -0.148** -0.161** -0.175*   -0.174**  -0.162**  -0.167** -0.176**     -0.178** 1.148 
Independent variables              
L_FSAs    0.264***    0.268***  0.200**  0.197**  0.185**   0.187**   0.164*   0.146*  0.153*    0.138* 1.793 
L_LBAs   0.268***    0.268***  0.236**  0.225**  0.209**   0.210** 0.230**   0.215**  0.215**    0.203** 1.929 
F_FSAs    -0.332***  -0.287*** -0.273***  -0.268***  -0.234**  -0.293*** -0.221**     -0.281*** 2.166 
F_LBAs      -0.142*  -0.144*  -0.144*  -0.098   -0.080 -0.100     -0.082 1.538 
Moderators              
L_MNAs  0.122†   0.126†     0.068   0.069    0.065      0.053 1.604 
F_MNAs          -0.159* -0.149* -0.158*     -0.148* 1.933 
Interaction terms              
L_FSAs × L_MNAs    0.068       0.016       0.002 1.096 
F_FSAs × F_MNAs          -0.172**      - 0.170** 1.078 
Model fit              
N        185    185    185  185     185   185    185    185      185     185     185  
R2       0.203   0.449    0.453  0.509   0.523  0.526   0.527   0.537     0.564    0.539    0.566  
Adj-R2       0.190   0.430    0.432  0.492   0.505  0.505   0.502   0.516     0.542    0.516    0.539  
F value      15.35***  24.16***    20.97***  30.73***  27.77***  24.44***  21.62***  25.50***   25.20*** 22.78***   20.53***  
All coefficients are standardized 










Split-sample validation of the stepwise estimation models. 
Model components 
Overall sample 
     N=185 
Sub-sample 1 
      N=93 
Sub-sample 2 
N=92 
Independent variables (Main effect variables) 
Firm-specific advantage of local firms 
Beta coefficient    .161 Not entered Not entered 
t value 2.380*   
    
Location-based advantage of local firms 
Beta coefficient   .359   .405   .272 
t value 4.045*** 4.624*** 3.060** 
Firm-specific advantage of foreign firms  
Beta coefficient    -.241    -.253    -.331 
t value  -3.432***  -2.675**  -3.261** 
    
Multi-nationality advantage of foreign firms  
Beta coefficient   -.216   -.203   -.246 
t value -3.189** -2.043* -2.535** 
Model Fit 
R2     .494     .488     .483 
Adj- R2     .483     .471     .465 
S. E. of the estimate 14.431 15.648 13.616 
    
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001; (2-tailed). 
 
